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1 /*
2 * random.c -- A strong random number generator
3 *
4 * Version 0.94, last modified 11-Oct-95
5 *
6 * Copyright Theodore Ts'o, 1994, 1995. All rights reserved.
7 *
8 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
9 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
10 * are met:
11 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
12 * notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
13 * including the disclaimer of warranties.
14 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
15 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
16 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
17 * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
18 * products derived from this software without specific prior
19 * written permission.
20 *
21 * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
22 * the GNU Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are
23 * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is
24 * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
25 * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
26 *
27 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
28 * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
29 * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
30 * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
31 * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
32 * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
33 * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
34 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
35 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
36 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
37 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
38 */
39
40 /*
41 * (now, with legal B.S. out of the way.....)
42 *
43 * This routine gathers environmental noise from device drivers, etc.,
44 * and returns good random numbers, suitable for cryptographic use.
45 * Besides the obvious cryptographic uses, these numbers are also good
46 * for seeding TCP sequence numbers, and other places where it is
47 * desireable to have numbers which are not only random, but hard to
48 * predict by an attacker.
49 *
50 * Theory of operation
51 * ===================
52 *
53 * Computers are very predictable devices. Hence it is extremely hard
54 * to produce truely random numbers on a computer --- as opposed to
55 * pseudo-random numbers, which can easily generated by using a
56 * algorithm. Unfortunately, it is very easy for attackers to guess
57 * the sequence of pseudo-random number generators, and for some
58 * applications this is not acceptable. So instead, we must try to
59 * gather "environmental noise" from the computer's environment, which
60 * must be hard for outside attackers to observe, and use that to
61 * generate random numbers. In a Unix environment, this is best done
62 * from inside the kernel.
63 *
64 * Sources of randomness from the environment include inter-keyboard
65 * timings, inter-interrupt timings from some interrupts, and other
66 * events which are both (a) non-deterministic and (b) hard for an
67 * outside observer to measure. Randomness from these sources are
68 * added to an "entropy pool", which is mixed using a CRC-like function.
69 * This is not cryptographically strong, but it is adequate assuming
70 * the randomness is not chosen maliciously, and it is fast enough that
71 * the overhead of doing it on every interrupt is very reasonable.
72 * As random bytes are mixed into the entropy pool, the routines keep
73 * an *estimate* of how many bits of randomness have been stored into
74 * the random number generator's internal state.
75 *
76 * When random bytes are desired, they are obtained by taking the MD5
77 * hash of the contents of the "entropy pool". The MD5 hash avoids
78 * exposing the internal state of the entropy pool. It is believed to
79 * be computationally infeasible to derive any useful information
80 * about the input of MD5 from its output. Even if it is possible to
81 * analyze MD5 in some clever way, as long as the amount of data
82 * returned from the generator is less than the inherent entropy in
83 * the pool, the output data is totally unpredictable. For this
84 * reason, the routine decreases its internal estimate of how many
85 * bits of "true randomness" are contained in the entropy pool as it
86 * outputs random numbers.
87 *
88 * If this estimate goes to zero, the routine can still generate
89 * random numbers; however, an attacker may (at least in theory) be
90 * able to infer the future output of the generator from prior
91 * outputs. This requires successful cryptanalysis of MD5, which is
92 * not believed to be feasible, but there is a remote possiblility.
93 * Nonetheless, these numbers should be useful for the vast majority
94 * of purposes.
95 *
96 * Exported interfaces ---- output
97 * ===============================
98 *
99 * There are three exported interfaces; the first is one designed to
100 * be used from within the kernel:
101 *
102 * void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
103 *
104 * This interface will return the requested number of random bytes,
105 * and place it in the requested buffer.
106 *
107 * The two other interfaces are two character devices /dev/random and
108 * /dev/urandom. /dev/random is suitable for use when very high
109 * quality randomness is desired (for example, for key generation or
110 * one-time pads), as it will only return a maximum of the number of
111 * bits of randomness (as estimated by the random number generator)
112 * contained in the entropy pool.
113 *
114 * The /dev/urandom device does not have this limit, and will return
115 * as many bytes as are requested. As more and more random bytes are
116 * requested without giving time for the entropy pool to recharge,
117 * this will result in random numbers that are merely cryptographically
118 * strong. For many applications, however, this is acceptable.
119 *
120 * Exported interfaces ---- input
121 * ==============================
122 *
123 * The current exported interfaces for gathering environmental noise
124 * from the devices are:
125 *
126 * void add_keyboard_randomness(unsigned char scancode);
127 * void add_mouse_randomness(__u32 mouse_data);
128 * void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq);
129 * void add_blkdev_randomness(int irq);
130 *
131 * add_keyboard_randomness() uses the inter-keypress timing, as well as the
132 * scancode as random inputs into the "entropy pool".
133 *
134 * add_mouse_randomness() uses the mouse interrupt timing, as well as
135 * the reported position of the mouse from the hardware.
136 *
137 * add_interrupt_randomness() uses the inter-interrupt timing as random
138 * inputs to the entropy pool. Note that not all interrupts are good
139 * sources of randomness! For example, the timer interrupts is not a
140 * good choice, because the periodicity of the interrupts is to
141 * regular, and hence predictable to an attacker. Disk interrupts are
142 * a better measure, since the timing of the disk interrupts are more
143 * unpredictable.
144 *
145 * add_blkdev_randomness() times the finishing time of block requests.
146 *
147 * All of these routines try to estimate how many bits of randomness a
148 * particular randomness source. They do this by keeping track of the
149 * first and second order deltas of the event timings.
150 *
151 * Acknowledgements:
152 * =================
153 *
154 * Ideas for constructing this random number generator were derived
155 * from the Pretty Good Privacy's random number generator, and from
156 * private discussions with Phil Karn. Colin Plumb provided a faster
157 * random number generator, which speed up the mixing function of the
158 * entropy pool, taken from PGP 3.0 (under development). It has since
159 * been modified by myself to provide better mixing in the case where
160 * the input values to add_entropy_word() are mostly small numbers.
161 *
162 * Any flaws in the design are solely my responsibility, and should
163 * not be attributed to the Phil, Colin, or any of authors of PGP.
164 *
165 * The code for MD5 transform was taken from Colin Plumb's
166 * implementation, which has been placed in the public domain. The
167 * MD5 cryptographic checksum was devised by Ronald Rivest, and is
168 * documented in RFC 1321, "The MD5 Message Digest Algorithm".
169 *
170 * Further background information on this topic may be obtained from
171 * RFC 1750, "Randomness Recommendations for Security", by Donald
172 * Eastlake, Steve Crocker, and Jeff Schiller.
173 */
174
175 #include <linux/sched.h>
176 #include <linux/kernel.h>
177 #include <linux/major.h>
178 #include <linux/string.h>
179 #include <linux/fcntl.h>
180 #include <linux/malloc.h>
181 #include <linux/random.h>
182
183 #include <asm/segment.h>
184 #include <asm/irq.h>
185 #include <asm/io.h>
186
187 /*
188 * The pool is stirred with a primitive polynomial of degree 128
189 * over GF(2), namely x^128 + x^119 + x^72 + x^64 + x^14 + x^8 + 1.
190 * For a pool of size 64, try x^64+x^62+x^38+x^10+x^6+x+1.
191 */
192 #define POOLWORDS 128 /* Power of 2 - note that this is 32-bit words */
193 #define POOLBITS (POOLWORDS*32)
194 #if POOLWORDS == 128
195 #define TAP1 119 /* The polynomial taps */
196 #define TAP2 72
197 #define TAP3 64
198 #define TAP4 14
199 #define TAP5 8
200 #elif POOLWORDS == 64
201 #define TAP1 62 /* The polynomial taps */
202 #define TAP2 38
203 #define TAP3 10
204 #define TAP4 6
205 #define TAP5 1
206 #else
207 #error No primitive polynomial available for chosen POOLWORDS
208 #endif
209
210 /* There is actually only one of these, globally. */
211 struct random_bucket {
212 unsigned add_ptr;
213 unsigned entropy_count;
214 int input_rotate;
215 __u32 *pool;
216 };
217
218 /* There is one of these per entropy source */
219 struct timer_rand_state {
220 unsigned long last_time;
221 int last_delta;
222 int nbits;
223 };
224
225 static struct random_bucket random_state;
226 static __u32 random_pool[POOLWORDS];
227 static struct timer_rand_state keyboard_timer_state;
228 static struct timer_rand_state mouse_timer_state;
229 static struct timer_rand_state extract_timer_state;
230 static struct timer_rand_state *irq_timer_state[NR_IRQS];
231 static struct timer_rand_state *blkdev_timer_state[MAX_BLKDEV];
232 static struct wait_queue *random_wait;
233
234 #ifndef MIN
235 #define MIN(a,b) (((a) < (b)) ? (a) : (b))
236 #endif
237
238 void rand_initialize(void)
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*/
239 {
240 random_state.add_ptr = 0;
241 random_state.entropy_count = 0;
242 random_state.pool = random_pool;
243 memset(irq_timer_state, 0, sizeof(irq_timer_state));
244 memset(blkdev_timer_state, 0, sizeof(blkdev_timer_state));
245 random_wait = NULL;}
246
247 void rand_initialize_irq(int irq)
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*/
248 {
249 if (irq >= NR_IRQS || irq_timer_state[irq])
250 return;
251
252 /*
253 * If kamlloc returns null, we just won't use that entropy
254 * source.
255 */
256 irq_timer_state[irq] = kmalloc(sizeof(struct timer_rand_state),
257 GFP_KERNEL);
258 }
259
260 void rand_initialize_blkdev(int major)
/* */
261 {
262 if (major >= MAX_BLKDEV || blkdev_timer_state[major])
263 return;
264
265 /*
266 * If kamlloc returns null, we just won't use that entropy
267 * source.
268 */
269 blkdev_timer_state[major] = kmalloc(sizeof(struct timer_rand_state),
270 GFP_KERNEL);
271 }
272
273 /*
274 * This function adds a byte into the entropy "pool". It does not
275 * update the entropy estimate. The caller must do this if appropriate.
276 *
277 * The pool is stirred with a primitive polynomial of degree 128
278 * over GF(2), namely x^128 + x^119 + x^72 + x^64 + x^14 + x^8 + 1.
279 * For a pool of size 64, try x^64+x^62+x^38+x^10+x^6+x+1.
280 *
281 * We rotate the input word by a changing number of bits, to help
282 * assure that all bits in the entropy get toggled. Otherwise, if we
283 * consistently feed the entropy pool small numbers (like jiffies and
284 * scancodes, for example), the upper bits of the entropy pool don't
285 * get affected. --- TYT, 10/11/95
286 */
287 static inline void add_entropy_word(struct random_bucket *r,
/* */
288 const __u32 input)
289 {
290 unsigned i;
291 __u32 w;
292
293 w = (input << r->input_rotate) | (input >> (32 - r->input_rotate));
294 i = r->add_ptr = (r->add_ptr - 1) & (POOLWORDS-1);
295 if (i)
296 r->input_rotate = (r->input_rotate + 7) & 31;
297 else
298 /*
299 * At the beginning of the pool, add an extra 7 bits
300 * rotation, so that successive passes spread the
301 * input bits across the pool evenly.
302 */
303 r->input_rotate = (r->input_rotate + 14) & 31;
304
305 /* XOR in the various taps */
306 w ^= r->pool[(i+TAP1)&(POOLWORDS-1)];
307 w ^= r->pool[(i+TAP2)&(POOLWORDS-1)];
308 w ^= r->pool[(i+TAP3)&(POOLWORDS-1)];
309 w ^= r->pool[(i+TAP4)&(POOLWORDS-1)];
310 w ^= r->pool[(i+TAP5)&(POOLWORDS-1)];
311 w ^= r->pool[i];
312 /* Rotate w left 1 bit (stolen from SHA) and store */
313 r->pool[i] = (w << 1) | (w >> 31);
314 }
315
316 /*
317 * This function adds entropy to the entropy "pool" by using timing
318 * delays. It uses the timer_rand_state structure to make an estimate
319 * of how many bits of entropy this call has added to the pool.
320 *
321 * The number "num" is also added to the pool - it should somehow describe
322 * the type of event which just happened. This is currently 0-255 for
323 * keyboard scan codes, and 256 upwards for interrupts.
324 * On the i386, this is assumed to be at most 16 bits, and the high bits
325 * are used for a high-resolution timer.
326 *
327 * TODO: Read the time stamp register on the Pentium.
328 */
329 static void add_timer_randomness(struct random_bucket *r,
/* */
330 struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned num)
331 {
332 int delta, delta2;
333 unsigned nbits;
334 __u32 time;
335
336 #if defined (__i386__)
337 if (x86_capability & 16) {
338 unsigned long low, high;
339 __asm__(".byte 0x0f,0x31"
340 :"=a" (low), "=d" (high));
341 time = (__u32) low;
342 num ^= (__u32) high;
343 } else {
344 #if 0
345 /*
346 * On a 386, read the high resolution timer. We assume that
347 * this gives us 2 bits of randomness.
348 *
349 * This is turned off for now because of the speed hit
350 * it entails.
351 */
352 outb_p(0x00, 0x43); /* latch the count ASAP */
353 num |= inb_p(0x40) << 16;
354 num |= inb(0x40) << 24;
355 r->entropy_count += 2;
356 #endif
357
358 time = jiffies;
359 }
360 #else
361 time = jiffies;
362 #endif
363
364 add_entropy_word(r, (__u32) num);
365 add_entropy_word(r, time);
366
367 /*
368 * Calculate number of bits of randomness we probably
369 * added. We take into account the first and second order
370 * deltas in order to make our estimate.
371 */
372 delta = time - state->last_time;
373 state->last_time = time;
374
375 delta2 = delta - state->last_delta;
376 state->last_delta = delta;
377
378 if (delta < 0) delta = -delta;
379 if (delta2 < 0) delta2 = -delta2;
380 delta = MIN(delta, delta2) >> 1;
381 for (nbits = 0; delta; nbits++)
382 delta >>= 1;
383
384 r->entropy_count += nbits;
385
386 /* Prevent overflow */
387 if (r->entropy_count > POOLBITS)
388 r->entropy_count = POOLBITS;
389
390 wake_up_interruptible(&random_wait);
391 }
392
393 void add_keyboard_randomness(unsigned char scancode)
/* */
394 {
395 add_timer_randomness(&random_state, &keyboard_timer_state, scancode);
396 }
397
398 void add_mouse_randomness(__u32 mouse_data)
/* */
399 {
400 add_timer_randomness(&random_state, &mouse_timer_state, mouse_data);
401 }
402
403 void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq)
/* */
404 {
405 if (irq >= NR_IRQS || irq_timer_state[irq] == 0)
406 return;
407
408 add_timer_randomness(&random_state, irq_timer_state[irq], 0x100+irq);
409 }
410
411 void add_blkdev_randomness(int major)
/* */
412 {
413 if (major >= MAX_BLKDEV || blkdev_timer_state[major] == 0)
414 return;
415
416 add_timer_randomness(&random_state, blkdev_timer_state[major],
417 0x200+major);
418 }
419
420 /*
421 * MD5 transform algorithm, taken from code written by Colin Plumb,
422 * and put into the public domain
423 *
424 * QUESTION: Replace this with SHA, which as generally received better
425 * reviews from the cryptographic community?
426 */
427
428 /* The four core functions - F1 is optimized somewhat */
429
430 /* #define F1(x, y, z) (x & y | ~x & z) */
431 #define F1(x, y, z) (z ^ (x & (y ^ z)))
432 #define F2(x, y, z) F1(z, x, y)
433 #define F3(x, y, z) (x ^ y ^ z)
434 #define F4(x, y, z) (y ^ (x | ~z))
435
436 /* This is the central step in the MD5 algorithm. */
437 #define MD5STEP(f, w, x, y, z, data, s) \
438 ( w += f(x, y, z) + data, w = w<<s | w>>(32-s), w += x )
439
440 /*
441 * The core of the MD5 algorithm, this alters an existing MD5 hash to
442 * reflect the addition of 16 longwords of new data. MD5Update blocks
443 * the data and converts bytes into longwords for this routine.
444 */
445 static void MD5Transform(__u32 buf[4],
/* */
446 __u32 const in[16])
447 {
448 __u32 a, b, c, d;
449
450 a = buf[0];
451 b = buf[1];
452 c = buf[2];
453 d = buf[3];
454
455 MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[ 0]+0xd76aa478, 7);
456 MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[ 1]+0xe8c7b756, 12);
457 MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[ 2]+0x242070db, 17);
458 MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[ 3]+0xc1bdceee, 22);
459 MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[ 4]+0xf57c0faf, 7);
460 MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[ 5]+0x4787c62a, 12);
461 MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[ 6]+0xa8304613, 17);
462 MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[ 7]+0xfd469501, 22);
463 MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[ 8]+0x698098d8, 7);
464 MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[ 9]+0x8b44f7af, 12);
465 MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[10]+0xffff5bb1, 17);
466 MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[11]+0x895cd7be, 22);
467 MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[12]+0x6b901122, 7);
468 MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[13]+0xfd987193, 12);
469 MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[14]+0xa679438e, 17);
470 MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[15]+0x49b40821, 22);
471
472 MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[ 1]+0xf61e2562, 5);
473 MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[ 6]+0xc040b340, 9);
474 MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[11]+0x265e5a51, 14);
475 MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[ 0]+0xe9b6c7aa, 20);
476 MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[ 5]+0xd62f105d, 5);
477 MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[10]+0x02441453, 9);
478 MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[15]+0xd8a1e681, 14);
479 MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[ 4]+0xe7d3fbc8, 20);
480 MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[ 9]+0x21e1cde6, 5);
481 MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[14]+0xc33707d6, 9);
482 MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[ 3]+0xf4d50d87, 14);
483 MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[ 8]+0x455a14ed, 20);
484 MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[13]+0xa9e3e905, 5);
485 MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[ 2]+0xfcefa3f8, 9);
486 MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[ 7]+0x676f02d9, 14);
487 MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[12]+0x8d2a4c8a, 20);
488
489 MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[ 5]+0xfffa3942, 4);
490 MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[ 8]+0x8771f681, 11);
491 MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[11]+0x6d9d6122, 16);
492 MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[14]+0xfde5380c, 23);
493 MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[ 1]+0xa4beea44, 4);
494 MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[ 4]+0x4bdecfa9, 11);
495 MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[ 7]+0xf6bb4b60, 16);
496 MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[10]+0xbebfbc70, 23);
497 MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[13]+0x289b7ec6, 4);
498 MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[ 0]+0xeaa127fa, 11);
499 MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[ 3]+0xd4ef3085, 16);
500 MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[ 6]+0x04881d05, 23);
501 MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[ 9]+0xd9d4d039, 4);
502 MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[12]+0xe6db99e5, 11);
503 MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[15]+0x1fa27cf8, 16);
504 MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[ 2]+0xc4ac5665, 23);
505
506 MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[ 0]+0xf4292244, 6);
507 MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[ 7]+0x432aff97, 10);
508 MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[14]+0xab9423a7, 15);
509 MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[ 5]+0xfc93a039, 21);
510 MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[12]+0x655b59c3, 6);
511 MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[ 3]+0x8f0ccc92, 10);
512 MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[10]+0xffeff47d, 15);
513 MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[ 1]+0x85845dd1, 21);
514 MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[ 8]+0x6fa87e4f, 6);
515 MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[15]+0xfe2ce6e0, 10);
516 MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[ 6]+0xa3014314, 15);
517 MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[13]+0x4e0811a1, 21);
518 MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[ 4]+0xf7537e82, 6);
519 MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[11]+0xbd3af235, 10);
520 MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[ 2]+0x2ad7d2bb, 15);
521 MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[ 9]+0xeb86d391, 21);
522
523 buf[0] += a;
524 buf[1] += b;
525 buf[2] += c;
526 buf[3] += d;
527 }
528
529 #undef F1
530 #undef F2
531 #undef F3
532 #undef F4
533 #undef MD5STEP
534
535
536 #if POOLWORDS % 16
537 #error extract_entropy() assumes that POOLWORDS is a multiple of 16 words.
538 #endif
539 /*
540 * This function extracts randomness from the "entropy pool", and
541 * returns it in a buffer. This function computes how many remaining
542 * bits of entropy are left in the pool, but it does not restrict the
543 * number of bytes that are actually obtained.
544 */
545 static inline int extract_entropy(struct random_bucket *r, char * buf,
/* */
546 int nbytes, int to_user)
547 {
548 int ret, i;
549 __u32 tmp[4];
550
551 add_timer_randomness(r, &extract_timer_state, nbytes);
552
553 /* Redundant, but just in case... */
554 if (r->entropy_count > POOLBITS)
555 r->entropy_count = POOLBITS;
556 /* Why is this here? Left in from Ted Ts'o. Perhaps to limit time. */
557 if (nbytes > 32768)
558 nbytes = 32768;
559
560 ret = nbytes;
561 if (r->entropy_count / 8 >= nbytes)
562 r->entropy_count -= nbytes*8;
563 else
564 r->entropy_count = 0;
565
566 while (nbytes) {
567 /* Hash the pool to get the output */
568 tmp[0] = 0x67452301;
569 tmp[1] = 0xefcdab89;
570 tmp[2] = 0x98badcfe;
571 tmp[3] = 0x10325476;
572 for (i = 0; i < POOLWORDS; i += 16)
573 MD5Transform(tmp, r->pool+i);
574 /* Modify pool so next hash will produce different results */
575 add_entropy_word(r, tmp[0]);
576 add_entropy_word(r, tmp[1]);
577 add_entropy_word(r, tmp[2]);
578 add_entropy_word(r, tmp[3]);
579 /*
580 * Run the MD5 Transform one more time, since we want
581 * to add at least minimal obscuring of the inputs to
582 * add_entropy_word(). --- TYT
583 */
584 MD5Transform(tmp, r->pool);
585
586 /* Copy data to destination buffer */
587 i = MIN(nbytes, 16);
588 if (to_user)
589 memcpy_tofs(buf, (__u8 const *)tmp, i);
590 else
591 memcpy(buf, (__u8 const *)tmp, i);
592 nbytes -= i;
593 buf += i;
594 }
595
596 /* Wipe data from memory */
597 memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp));
598
599 return ret;
600 }
601
602 /*
603 * This function is the exported kernel interface. It returns some
604 * number of good random numbers, suitable for seeding TCP sequence
605 * numbers, etc.
606 */
607 void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes)
/* */
608 {
609 extract_entropy(&random_state, (char *) buf, nbytes, 0);
610 }
611
612 int read_random(struct inode * inode, struct file * file,
/* */
613 char * buf, int nbytes)
614 {
615 if (nbytes > random_state.entropy_count / 8)
616 nbytes = random_state.entropy_count / 8;
617
618 return extract_entropy(&random_state, buf, nbytes, 1);
619 }
620
621 int read_random_unlimited(struct inode * inode, struct file * file,
/* */
622 char * buf, int nbytes)
623 {
624 return extract_entropy(&random_state, buf, nbytes, 1);
625 }
626
627 int write_random(struct inode * inode, struct file * file,
/* */
628 const char * buffer, int count)
629 {
630 int i;
631 __u32 word, *p;
632
633 for (i = count, p = (__u32 *)buffer;
634 i >= sizeof(__u32);
635 i-= sizeof(__u32), p++) {
636 memcpy_fromfs(&word, p, sizeof(__u32));
637 add_entropy_word(&random_state, word);
638 }
639 if (i) {
640 word = 0;
641 memcpy_fromfs(&word, p, i);
642 add_entropy_word(&random_state, word);
643 }
644 inode->i_mtime = CURRENT_TIME;
645 return count;
646 }
647
648 int random_ioctl(struct inode * inode, struct file * file,
/* ![[last]](../icons/n_last.png)
*/
649 unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
650 {
651 int *p, max_size;
652
653 switch (cmd) {
654 case RNDGETENTCNT:
655 put_user(random_state.entropy_count, (int *) arg);
656 return 0;
657 case RNDADDTOENTCNT:
658 if (!suser())
659 return -EPERM;
660 random_state.entropy_count += get_user((int *) arg);
661 if (random_state.entropy_count > POOLBITS)
662 random_state.entropy_count = POOLBITS;
663 return 0;
664 case RNDGETPOOL:
665 if (!suser())
666 return -EPERM;
667 p = (int *) arg;
668 put_user(random_state.entropy_count, p);
669 max_size = get_user(++p);
670 put_user(POOLWORDS, p);
671 if (max_size < 0)
672 return -EINVAL;
673 if (max_size > POOLWORDS)
674 max_size = POOLWORDS;
675 memcpy_tofs(++p, random_state.pool,
676 max_size*sizeof(__u32));
677 return 0;
678 default:
679 return -EINVAL;
680 }
681 }
![[bottom]](../icons/n_bottom.png){kind=icon}
*/